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Abstract
Why do a market’s prices move up or down? Claims about causes are made without actual
information, and accepted or dismissed based upon poor or non-existent evidence. Here we inves-
tigate the price movements that ended with Apple stock closing at $500.00 on January 18, 2013.
There is a ready explanation for this price movement: market manipulation by those who sold
stock options, who stood to directly benefit from this closing price. Indeed, one web commentator
predicted this otherwise unlikely event publicly. This explanation was subsequently dismissed by
press articles that claim that stock prices end near such round numbers based upon legitimate
hedging activity. But how can we know? We show that the accepted model that points to hedging
as the driving cause of prices is not quantitatively consistent with the price movement on that day.
The price moved upward too quickly over a period in which the hedgers position would require
selling rather than buying. Under these conditions hedgers would have driven the price away from
the strike price rather than toward it. We also show that a long published theory of the role of
hedging is incomplete mathematically, and that the correct theory results in much weaker price
movements. This evidence substantially weakens the case of those who claim hedging as cause of
anomalous market price movements. The explanation that market manipulation is responsible for
the final close cannot be dismissed based upon unsubstantiated, even invalid, hedging claims. Such
proffered explanations shield potential illegal activity from further inquiry even though the claims
behind those explanations have not been demonstrated.
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On Friday, January 18, 2013, Apple Inc. stock (AAPL) closed at exactly $500.00 per share.
This date was of particular significance in the market for side contracts for buying and selling
Apple stock due to the expiration of options, with options expiring for $1.5 billion dollars
of stock based upon a price difference of just one penny in the price. At $500.01 options to
buy stock with a value of $1.5 billion would not have expired, and at $499.99 options to sell
$1.5 billion of stock would not have expired, based upon the outstanding contracts at the
open of trading on that day [1]. Trading during the day may have affected these numbers.
The reason for the large number of such options is the round price at expiration and that
this Friday in January was a unique one during the year whose associated options were
available to buy and sell for two years. Two explanations for the closing price have been put
forward: Manipulation by those who stood to gain by the expiration of those options [2–4],
and legitimate stock trading activities that are used to offset (hedge) changes in option value
[5–9]. Both explanations are based upon the recognition that the expiration of options has
a potential influence on the price of the stock, especially close to their expiration dates. On
such a date the precise closing price determines which options expire without value. Here we
quantitatively investigate the explanation that the closing price is due to legitimate trading
based upon hedging, and show that this explanation cannot account for the movement of
the stock price.
Options are highly leveraged “side-bets” on stock price movements. Sellers and buyers
gain or lose in a zero sum game betting on the price movements of stocks. The high leverage
arises because the price of options is more closely related to the change of stock price than
the total stock price, so small bets can provide large gains if the seller or buyer anticipates
the movement of the underlying stock price. The percent gain of an option is often between
ten and one hundred times the percent gain of the underlying stock price. A “call” option
is an offer to buy a stock at a pre-specified price on a particular day, the expiration day,
and a “put” option is an offer to sell a stock at a pre-specified price on the expiration day.
If the price will go up it is good to buy a “call” option or sell a “put” option, and vice
versa if the price goes down. The importance of options to the stock market has increased
in recent years, particularly since the frequency of options expiration dates was increased
from monthly to weekly on July 1, 2010.
According to traditional analyses, the option price is determined by the stock price which
is itself determined by the fundamental value of the company for which the stock is issued
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[10, 11]. However, it has been found in theoretical and empirical studies that options trading
influences the price of stocks. The extent of this influence is not well understood, however,
it has been shown that options can change stock price volatility [12–15], even affecting the
entire market [16]. Furthermore, on options expiration dates, it has been shown empirically
that stock prices tend to aggregate near the expiration strike prices of the options more often
than they would at random [17–19]. This effect is called clustering or pinning. Thus, for
example, since options strike prices sold for Apple are multiples of $5, the expiration price
is likely to be closer to such a strike price than expected by random price movements. It
is now well established that closing prices prior to expiration dates are affected by options.
However, there may be multiple mechanisms and the specific reason that this occurs in any
one case or in general is not clear.
Given the volatility of the price of Apple stock the likelihood that the Friday, January
18, 2013, Apple Inc. stock (AAPL) close occurred at exactly $500.00 per share by chance on
this specific date is less than one in 1,000. Options effects on expiration date closing prices
provide potential explanations for the special closing price. There are two explanations
for this occurrence and there is some empirical evidence that they have occurred in other
circumstances [19]. The first cites manipulation by those who sell the underlying stock to
cause the options that they have sold to expire, resulting in no obligation on their part to
fulfill the contracts. The second attributes price movements to the legitimate buying and
selling of stock for the purpose of reducing risk (hedging) in corresponding options positions
by large traders, often specific organizations that are considered “market makers,” who
participate in the market to profit from executing many transactions rather than from stock
price movements [17, 18]. These effects have been suggested to give rise to price clustering
at expiration and other price movements that result in maximum losses to those who buy
options, the maximum pain theory (maxpain) [20, 21].
The first explanation is anchored in the belief [22–24], supported by theoretical [26] and
empirical [19, 27] evidence, that large traders take the future into their own hands through
market manipulation. According to this explanation, reliable profits can be made by buying
or selling options and subsequently manipulating the underlying stock price. Rather than
stock prices being an outcome of buying low and selling high, or even trend following,
prices are driven in the direction that causes the desired option price changes. A widely
publicized example occurred 20 years ago in the case of a purchase by a single trader of
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$500 million of options on Venezuelan bonds from a broker-dealer, whose expiration value
was subsequently subject to a trading war in which each side of the original options trade
strove to move prices in the direction that would favor themselves [28, 29]. More generally,
market manipulation has been analyzed and shown to occur [30, 31]. The idea that markets
may deviate temporarily but will eventually come into equilibrium does not apply to options
because they expire at a particular date. Manipulation would intensify toward an expiration
date, with distinct groups competing with each other based upon purchasing power to drive
the price in the direction they need to make a profit.
The second explanation is based upon an understanding of the process of risk reduction
by hedging [17, 18, 32, 33]. A market maker sells or buys options depending on the demand
from others. However, the market maker may not want to carry the risk associated with
the positions they accumulate. One of the standard strategies that may be used by market
makers to reduce their risk is by offsetting gains or losses in the options by buying or selling
the underlying stock. Thus, if a market maker sells options to buy a stock, they themselves
will be responsible for delivering the stock at expiration and therefore they must hold the
stock in case it increases in value. Similarly, if they sell options to sell a stock, they would
hold a negative “short” position in the stock so that the effect of delivery of a stock to them
at expiration will be offset as well. The amount of stock they have to own changes as time
progresses toward expiration. This process of hedging options against the underlying stock
price is called “delta hedging.” The rate of change of the value of the options as a function
of price variation in the stock is called “delta.” The aggregate value of delta for the position
is the amount of stock that a hedger must own to prevent a price movement from changing
the value of the position.
The case of stock prices moving toward strike prices by hedging activity occurs when the
market maker has a net (positive) position of call and put options at a specific strike price
near the price at which the stock is trading during the final hours of trading. By contrast, if
the market maker has a constant net negative option position then the price will be driven
away from the strike price by hedging. While it seems that market makers are more likely to
be net sellers of options, there is evidence that under certain circumstances they end up as
net buyers [15]. Suppose market makers are following a delta-hedging strategy. If they are
holding call options, and the price is above the strike price, then they will hedge by selling
the underlying stock. If they are holding put options, and the price is below the strike price,
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then they will hedge by buying the underlying stock (regardless of whether they also hold call
options, because those options are due to expire valueless). If this is a sufficient percentage
of the market activity, selling above the strike price, and buying below the strike price, will
act as forces on the price, driving it toward the strike price from above or below, “pinning”
the price to the strike price approaching expiration. Strike prices that have more options
associated with them would according to this theory have a stronger attraction, providing a
tentative explanation of the close at $500.00, whose round number and extended period of
options availability resulted in a particularly large amount of options sold.
We will show, however, that this picture of legitimate hedging does not apply to the
price behavior on Friday, January 18 based upon a direct analysis of the price movement on
that day. The price movement toward the strike price from below occurred at a time and
with a rate of change that would have required delta-hedgers to respond by selling rather
than buying, driving the price away from rather than toward the strike price. The price
approached the strike price during the final hour of trading from below. Price movements
themselves result in a need for hedgers to change their positions. During this period, the
price movement toward the strike price was so fast that the hedgers would have sold rather
than bought stock. This means that the force of hedging, to the extent that it occurred,
would have opposed the price movement and cannot be used to explain the movement of
the price toward its closing value.
Figure 1A shows the actual AAPL stock price over the course of January 18, 2013, which
oscillates before moving upwards toward the option strike price at $500. Figure 1B shows
the corresponding values of the amount of hedging needed to counter those prices based
upon a calculation of delta, the rate of change of option values relative to the stock price
[10, 11]. For hedging to be responsible for the increasing price, the amount of stocks that
are needed for hedging would have to increase, leading them to buy. Instead we see that
the amount decreases over time as the price moves toward the strike price during the last
hour of trading. The reason for the decrease is that the hedging fraction is smaller for prices
nearer to the strike price at a particular time, while it increases over time at a given price.
How much hedging is needed thus depends on both time and price.
The size of the AAPL price movement at the time it took place is inconsistent with
hedging. While the amount of hedging that is needed increases with time, overpowering this
trend are movements of the amount of hedging toward zero, mirroring movements toward
5
the strike price in the price data. This shows that the approach of the price to the strike
price is faster than would be explained by pinning. Indeed, the price is approaching the
strike price in spite of any hedging behavior that might be taking place by market makers,
not because of it. Thus hedging activity cannot explain the approach of the stock price
toward the strike price.
We can construct a dynamic model of hedging based upon a quantitative description
of delta hedging activity. We use a modified version of a model presented previously by
Avellaneda and Lipkin [18]. The modification is necessary because they neglected to include
one of two terms in the hedging activity. Specifically, they included the time dependence of
the hedger’s position but not its price dependence.
The model is based upon two equations, one that characterizes the volume of trading that
is performed by the hedgers and one that calculates the impact of that trading on market
prices. Price changes in the market are proportional to the amount of buying and selling
hedgers do according to price elasticity with large trades [18]:
∆S
S
= EQ (1)
where S is the current (spot) price, and ∆S/S is the relative change in spot price, which is
proportional to Q, the size of the excess supply (Q < 0) or demand (Q > 0) of the stock
traded. The proportionality constant E represents the price-demand elasticity of a given
stock.
Consider the case in which the supply/demand Q is due to market makers hedging their
positions. In particular, we assume that the market makers own a net of n straddles (both
a call and a put) with strike price K and expiration time t0. Their hedging is proportional
to the change in the delta of a straddle on the stock with respect to time multiplied by n.
The delta, δ(S, τ), is a function of the current price and the time until expiration, τ = t0− t,
given to first order by
δ(S, τ) = 2N(d1)− 1 (2)
where N is the cumulative normal distribution function, and
d1 =
1
σ
√
τ
(
ln
(
S
K
)
+
(
µ+
σ2
2
)
τ
)
(3)
where σ is the implied volatility and K is the strike price of the options. Then we have:
∆S
S
= −Endδ(S, τ)
dt
∆t (4)
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FIG. 1: (A) Price of AAPL stock during January 18, 2013. (B) The amount of hedging needed by
the owner of straddles (equal numbers of puts and calls) as determined by the stock prices. During
the closing hour the amount of hedging needed decreases and the stock must be sold which would
drive the price down, away from the strike price rather than toward it. The reason for the decrease
in hedging is due to the time and rate of change of the prices toward the strike price. These results
are counter to the claim that hedging is responsible for the closing strike price.
The derivative has two terms, one is the contribution directly due to time variation, i.e. the
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partial derivative with respect to time,
∂δ(S, τ)
∂t
=
1√
2pi
e−
d21
2
(
1
στ 3/2
ln
(
S
K
)
− µ+
1
2
σ2
σ
√
τ
)
(5)
and the second is the derivative with respect to price times the price change with respect to
time,
∂δ(S, τ)
∂S
dS
dt
=
1√
2pi
e−
d21
2
2
σ
√
τS
dS
dt
. (6)
The original derivation by Avellaneda and Lipkin included only the first of these terms (we
also corrected an errant factor of two in their formula). The total derivative is
dδ(S, τ)
dt
=
1√
2pi
e−
d21
2
(
2
σ
√
τS
dS
dt
+
1
στ 3/2
ln
(
S
K
)
− µ+
1
2
σ2
σ
√
τ
)
. (7)
Collecting terms, we obtain the differential equation (∆t→ 0):
dS
dt
=
S
[
µ+ 1
2
σ2 − 1
τ
ln
(
S
K
)]
σ
√
2piτ
En
e
1
2
d21 + 2
(8)
We can make scaling substitutions of price, time, volatility and elasticity
z =
ln
(
S
K
)
σ
√
t0
, s =
t
t0
, α =
(
µ+ 1
2
σ2
)√
t0
σ
, β =
nE√
2piσ2t0
(9)
to obtain d1 =
z√
1−s + α
√
1− s and
dz
ds
=
α− z
1−s
√
1−s
β
e
z2
2(1−s)+
1
2
α2(1−s)+zα + 2
(10)
Solving numerically, using parameters appropriate to the case of AAPL on January 18,
2013, we obtain the dynamics shown in Figure 2A. In Figure 2B, we show the the amount
of hedging N(d1), calculated from the simulated price. As the expiration time approaches,
hedging increases, driving the stock toward the strike price (as is expected from pinning).
However, the approach toward the strike price is limited by a feedback from the price
dependence of the hedging. The hedger that buys stock causing a price increase dynamically
adjusts the amount of stock purchased as that same price increase leads to a smaller need
for hedging. The maximal impact of hedgers is obtained by taking the limit as E goes to
infinity (β →∞)
dz
ds
=
1
2
(
α +
z
s− 1
)
(11)
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which can be solved analytically to yield:
z = −α(s− 1) + k√s− 1 (12)
where k =
√
1− s0(z0 − α(s0 − 1)) is a constant. Note that in all cases the price behavior
is very different from that found for AAPL on January 18 as price movements occur much
closer to the closing.
Random price movements due to other trading activity disrupt the process of hedger’s
influencing prices. Simulations with noise are shown in Figure 3, with parameters appro-
priate to Apple on January 18, 2013, and using the average intraday volatility for January.
The wide range of closing prices gives an estimate, with hedging, of the probability of the
final price reaching its the strike price of less than 1 per thousand based upon 5,000 runs,
even with the starting price as close as it was to $500.00 on that day. The effect of hedging
is weak compared to the underlying price volatility.
The scenario we have analyzed is based upon the premise of a fixed number of options
held by the hedger throughout the expiration date. There are two other scenarios that allow
for a substantial number of options traded during the day of expiration. Option trading
during the day may be done for two reasons. First is the usual opportunity for traders to
buy and sell options, which may, but often does not, result in a major change in the number
of open positions. The second is the possibility of the large number of pre-existing option
positions being closed before expiration in order not to incur the cost of the subsequent
ownership or sale of underlying stock.
The first trading scenario does not provide a sufficient explanation for the close at $500.00
as it would not be unique to the specific closing day or closing price. Any expiration day,
i.e. any Friday, and any expiration price, i.e. multiple of $5.00, would give rise to the same
conditions. Such an explanation is therefore insufficient. Only one prior close at a strike
price happened in 133 weeks since the introduction of the weekly options in July of 2010 [1],
and therefore would not explain the coincidence of special date and price on January 18.
The second trading scenario would be based upon a different assumption about the hedg-
ing. Instead of the hedger having bought the options, the hedger would be assumed to have
sold the options. Under these conditions traders may close their positions by selling the
options on the expiration day, and the hedger would purchase the options and subsequently
reduce its hedging position accordingly. The reduction in hedging would drive the price
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FIG. 2: (A) Simulation of the effect of hedging on prices until 3 minutes before 4:00 PM close at
expiration. Curves are for different hedging impacts, nE/
√
2pi, which saturates at a maximum,∞,
due to the price changes impact on hedging. (B) Time series for hedging based on the simulated
price. Parameters are based on AAPL stocks on January 18, 2013. The price at the 10:00 AM
open, $498.34, strike price K = $500.00, and the implied volatility σ = 1.102× 10−3/√min [? ].
upwards if the price is below the strike price, nominally giving a reason for reaching the
strike price. However, under these conditions, the underlying hedging would drive the price
away from the strike price causing the strike price to be unstable, and the driving force away
increases as the price moves toward the strike price, and as the time approaches the closing.
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FIG. 3: Simulation of the effect of hedging on prices including noise. Fifty instances are shown.
Parameters are based on AAPL stocks on January 18, 2013, and noise consistent with the average
intraday volatility in January. The price at the 10:00 AM open, $498.34, strike price K = $500.00.
On the other hand the impact of the sale of options is reduced as the price approaches the
strike price because the level of hedging is smaller. Moreover, a residual position held by
the hedger at the end of the day would still result in the price being driven away from the
strike price at closing. Simulations confirm there is no inherent reason for the closing price
to be the strike price. This scenario does not, therefore, provide a robust explanation for
closing at the strike price.
It is worth noting that for the case of a hedger having sold options (n negative), Eq. 8
can be singular due to cancelation of the two terms in the denominator. This singularity
corresponds to having insufficient stock trading volume to provide hedging for the outstand-
ing options. Under such conditions the hedging activity will drive the price far away from
the strike price resulting in an undefined, i.e. unstable, market price.
In contrast to the hedging explanations, the motivation and mechanism of manipulation
to a close at $500.00 arises when large traders, who might be market makers, choose not to
hedge, but rather to manipulate. For this case, a market maker would gain the most after
selling more options than buying by causing them to expire without value. The mechanism is
straightforward and is consistent with the price behavior on January 18: A sufficiently strong
market maker or large trader can force convergence to the strike price by trading directly
11
based upon the price rather than the option values, progressively confining it to a smaller
range, until the close. Given the large amount of options outstanding, this transparency of
the “simple explanation” led two commentators to predict the close [2, 3], and to explain
the motivations involved.
Our analysis suggests that it is possible to distinguish the role of hedging and manipu-
lation on price movements at expiration. It also provides new evidence that “side-bets” on
price movements create a mechanism for market manipulation and the associated financial
gains.
The existence of widely ignored evidence of market manipulation raises deeper questions
about the oversight of markets. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has been
criticized for lax oversight [34–37]. Some attribute the behavior of the SEC to regulatory
capture, a well known and long standing reality of regulatory agencies being influenced
by the companies they are supposed to regulate [38]; even a former top official at the
SEC has commented on the state of capture of the commission [36]. Given the size of
economic benefits from such an arrangement, and the covert nature of the influence, it is
well worthwhile to market participants to offer benefits to regulators such as monetary bribes
or future job prospects. We separately provide a game theory analysis of regulatory capture
showing that it is the economically rational outcome and therefore to be assumed unless the
impact of regulation (or lack thereof) becomes transparent [39].
In this context we can challenge the role of regulators and advocate for increased mar-
ket transparency to allow improved public visibility. Large amounts of data can be made
available for scrutiny for evidence of manipulation. Today, the stock holdings of large stock
owners are made public. The current three-month intervals at which such holdings are
revealed are insufficient. The original purpose of this public disclosure was to protect com-
panies and their investors from insider trading [40]. Today, however, an important means
of manipulation is by performing large volumes of trading at a particular time, rather than
through high levels of ownership and insider information. Since manipulation of stocks typ-
ically involves large transactions over a particular interval of time, especially a short one,
such transactions should be made public. Moreover, position reporting should be extended
to those who have sold short large amounts of the same stock after borrowing them, which
is currently not included in public information. Transaction data should be independently
made public to enable verification of the large transaction public reporting, which like the
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absence of illegal manipulation cannot otherwise be gauged.
Detecting market manipulation of expiration date closing prices is not difficult given the
right data, and that data is surely recorded. The pattern of trading of specific individuals
or groups that buy and sell both options and the underlying stock can be found. Among the
likely candidates for manipulation are the main market makers that provide liquidity to the
options market. While these market makers are often large banks [41, 42], the expectation
that such financial institutions are beyond culpability has been undermined [43–54]. There
is a direct financial motivation for such manipulation. While legitimate hedging reduces
their risk from price movements, manipulation leads to immediate gains.
Public disclosure of market makers and their activity may shed light on conflicts of in-
terest and potential roles in market manipulation. It has been stated that the primary
options market maker for AAPL is Goldman Sachs [55], though this information is not
widely discussed. We note that earlier in 2012, Goldman Sachs options investors publicly
recommended an options trade that would have provided profits if AAPL did not rise signif-
icantly. This trade ended badly for those who adopted their recommendation, but profited
the market maker that sold them those options [56]. A second recommendation by Goldman
Sachs in May 2013 to buy call options similarly resulted in losses for the buyers and gains
for the market maker [57]. These were the only two options purchase recommendations
reported in the press during this period.
What are the mechanisms for defeating market manipulation making use of options?
First, corporations and investors should be advocates of proper market oversight, and the
elimination of incentives and mechanisms of manipulation. Second, options trading should
be reduced voluntarily, if not by regulator action, to reduce the benefits from this kind
of manipulation. Third, manipulative price movements should be clearly identified, and
explanations as legitimate hedging be denied, so that non-enforcement by the SEC is a
matter of public dialog. Fourth, the possibility of class action suits against market makers
that can be identified should be explored. Fifth, data should be made publicly available to
increase the transparency of markets and expose manipulation as it occurs. A final, and
encompassing, option is to pursue collective action of investors to stabilize markets and
reduce the possibility of market manipulation.
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